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U.S. Law Week Summarizes SCOTUS Civil Litigation Cases
U.S. Law Week (7/19/11) has published a summary analysis of the Supreme Court's civil litigation cases from this term. Here is an excerpt:
Court Reins in Class Actions
Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes: Avoided employment discrimination “Armageddon” for national corporations by rejecting certification of largest class action in history.
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion: Allows companies to contract around the threat of consumer class actions by upholding an arbitration agreement containing a class action waiver.
Honorable Mention: PLIVA Inc. v. Mensing
Preemption, Immigration Cases Deliver Blow
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting: Arizona may administer the “business death penalty” to employers who hire illegal immigrants.
Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America Inc.: By providing a choice in safety features, federal regulations do not automatically preempt state tort claims against manufacturers.
Honorable Mentions: Thompson v. North American Stainless LP; Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp.
Cases Every Lawyer Should Study.
Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes: By emphasizing commonality considerations under Rule 23(a), the opinion is terra nova for arguments over how much “glue” is needed to hold class actions together.
J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. v. Nicastro: Plaintiffs’ lawyers must consider the decision when choosing the proper forum for product liability suits against foreign companies.
Honorable Mention: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion
More Questions Than Answers
J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. v. Nicastro: The court's failure to definitively address the questions left open by Asahi will lead to more litigation and confusion over personal jurisdiction.
PLIVA Inc. v. Mensing: The decision could signal a turning point in the court's preemption jurisprudence that may cause lower courts to struggle with its application.
Honorable Mentions: Global-Tech Appliances Inc. v. SEB S.A.; Turner v. Rogers
Little Fanfare but Significant Impact
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.: In an area of commercial speech increasingly regulated by states, a bold First Amendment holding should be a warning to legislatures to tread lightly.
Stern v. Marshall: Despite “soap opera facts,” ruling could dramatically burden the dockets of state and federal district courts.
Prison Relief and Unanimity Shock Observers
Brown v. Plata: The court's endorsement of broad injunctive relief, particularly in the area of prison management, was out of character.
Honorable Mention: Unanimous holdings in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, American Electric Power v. Connecticut, and Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes (on the Rule 23(b)(2) issue), were unexpected.
Got Our Attention, But Earth Didn't Move
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited Partnership: Although Microsoft asked the court to invalidate the long-established clear and convincing evidence standard for patent validity challenges, the court remained steadfast and left the current standard alone.
Flores-Villar v. United States: One of the two cases affirmed by an equally divided court, the decision illustrates the minimal impact Justice Elena Kagan's recusals had on the term.
Honorable Mentions: Snyder v. Phelps; Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association
Court Reins in Class Actions
Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes: Avoided employment discrimination “Armageddon” for national corporations by rejecting certification of largest class action in history.
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion: Allows companies to contract around the threat of consumer class actions by upholding an arbitration agreement containing a class action waiver.
Honorable Mention: PLIVA Inc. v. Mensing
Preemption, Immigration Cases Deliver Blow
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting: Arizona may administer the “business death penalty” to employers who hire illegal immigrants.
Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America Inc.: By providing a choice in safety features, federal regulations do not automatically preempt state tort claims against manufacturers.
Honorable Mentions: Thompson v. North American Stainless LP; Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp.
Cases Every Lawyer Should Study.
Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes: By emphasizing commonality considerations under Rule 23(a), the opinion is terra nova for arguments over how much “glue” is needed to hold class actions together.
J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. v. Nicastro: Plaintiffs’ lawyers must consider the decision when choosing the proper forum for product liability suits against foreign companies.
Honorable Mention: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion
More Questions Than Answers
J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. v. Nicastro: The court's failure to definitively address the questions left open by Asahi will lead to more litigation and confusion over personal jurisdiction.
PLIVA Inc. v. Mensing: The decision could signal a turning point in the court's preemption jurisprudence that may cause lower courts to struggle with its application.
Honorable Mentions: Global-Tech Appliances Inc. v. SEB S.A.; Turner v. Rogers
Little Fanfare but Significant Impact
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.: In an area of commercial speech increasingly regulated by states, a bold First Amendment holding should be a warning to legislatures to tread lightly.
Stern v. Marshall: Despite “soap opera facts,” ruling could dramatically burden the dockets of state and federal district courts.
Prison Relief and Unanimity Shock Observers
Brown v. Plata: The court's endorsement of broad injunctive relief, particularly in the area of prison management, was out of character.
Honorable Mention: Unanimous holdings in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, American Electric Power v. Connecticut, and Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes (on the Rule 23(b)(2) issue), were unexpected.
Got Our Attention, But Earth Didn't Move
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited Partnership: Although Microsoft asked the court to invalidate the long-established clear and convincing evidence standard for patent validity challenges, the court remained steadfast and left the current standard alone.
Flores-Villar v. United States: One of the two cases affirmed by an equally divided court, the decision illustrates the minimal impact Justice Elena Kagan's recusals had on the term.
Honorable Mentions: Snyder v. Phelps; Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association
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Israel’s Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction: An Empirical Study
The article reports the results of an empirical study conducted with respect to the appellate jurisdiction of the Israeli Supreme Court (hereinafter “ISC”).1 The ISC sits atop a high-quality common law system and functions as an appellate court for district court rulings. Cases in which the district court has original jurisdiction—particularly, criminal cases involving serious offenses and high value civil cases—are appealable, as of right, to the ISC (hereinafter “mandatory appeals”). The ISC also serves as a court of cassation for cases initiated in the lower magistrates’ courts, for which the district court is the first instance of appeal. These second review cases may be appealed to the ISC only with permission (hereinafter: “discretionary appeals”). The fact that, in some cases, the ISC has mandatory jurisdiction, as sole appellate court, while in others it provides a second level of discretionary review, allows for testing of the association between case outcomes and jurisdictional source.
Recent studies highlight the importance of distinguishing between mandatory and discretionary court jurisdiction when analyzing appellate court behavior and when interpreting basic outputs, such as reversal and dissent rates. Our study contributes to this line of analysis. It also resonates with another line of recent quantitative studies of U.S. federal and state intermediate appellate courts, which point to asymmetric case outcomes and to the fact that defendants fare better on civil appeals than do plaintiffs.
The study includes every ISC substantive opinion available online, via the official Israel Justice Authority (IJA) website, for all mandatory and discretionary criminal appeals decided in the years 2006–2007. It also consists of every ISC substantive opinion available online, via the official IJA website, for all mandatory and discretionary civil appeals decided in 2007 and in the months of August through December of 2006. Cases that were not decisions granting review, denying review, or on the merits were eliminated from the sample. Comprehensiveness and accuracy of the database were tested by comparing it with data obtained from the ISC secretariat. Covering a total of 3,562 cases, our database thus provides a rare statistical description of a broad class of case outcomes. The cases are described by subject area, litigant-pair characteristics, and source of jurisdiction.
The central findings of the study point to a substantial affirmed effect in mandatory-jurisdiction cases and to a lower affirmance rate in discretionary cases, with denial of review as the modal outcome. In mandatory-jurisdiction cases, the ISC affirmed lower court rulings in about 75% of district court criminal case appeals and in 67% of district court civil case appeals. In discretionary jurisdiction cases, the ISC rarely granted review. It reviewed about 6% of petitions in criminal cases and about 15% of petitions in civil cases. In discretionary cases in which the ISC did grant review, it tended to reverse at a much higher rate than in mandatory-jurisdiction cases, with an affirmance rate of 55% of criminal cases and 31% of civil cases. From a practical perspective, the high reversal rates in discretionary jurisdiction cases are perhaps less important than the low rate at which parties succeed in obtaining ISC review. In discretionary jurisdiction criminal cases, review was denied in 850 of 897 cases in which review was sought. If one adds to these 850 cases the 26 affirmances in which the ISC granted review, criminal defendants obtained relief from the ISC in 21 of 897 cases or 2.3% of filings with the requisite information. The story in civil discretionary cases is similar. The ISC denied review in 480 out of 572 cases. That there were 29 affirmances in cases granting review means that the result below was clearly reversed in 63 of 572 cases or only 11% of appellate filings.
Another central finding of our study is that reversal rates in the ISC vary not only by jurisdictional source but also by the identity of the appealing party—whether individual, corporation or government. Our results showed that the government fared better than non-state litigants, both in obtaining reversals of lower court rulings and in securing review of those rulings. Pro-corporate effects were not detected. Starting with the pro-government effect in mandatory civil cases, all litigant pairs, except the two involving the government as a losing defendant who appeals, showed the expected “affirmed effect” on appeal. The difference between affirmance rates in government-as-defendant-appellant cases and other defendant appeals was highly statistically significant (p=0.001). This result persisted as statistically significant in logistic regression models with “affirmed” as the dependent variable and explanatory variables. When the government won in the lower court and the non-government party appealed to the ISC, the expected affirmed effect held. Mandatory-jurisdiction criminal cases followed a similar pattern. Government secured reversal in 81.1% of the 146 cases it appealed. Criminal defendants, in contrast, secured reversal in only 15.1% of the 975 cases they appealed. This result likely is a combination of two forces. First, the government is more selective than defendants in deciding what cases to appeal. Given the high personal stakes for defendants, as well as the availability of public defense whose funding is borne by the taxpayers, the tendency to appeal is strong and can dominate even in cases with weak chances of appellate success. But, even accounting for such case selection, the ISC reversal rate for government appeals seems high. The government was also more successful than other litigants in securing ISC review of lower court decisions in discretionary jurisdiction cases. In criminal cases, the government obtained review in 71.4% of the cases sought compared to a 5.6% review rate for defendants. In civil cases, the government obtained review in 47.4% of the cases sought compared to a 14.2% review rate for other parties. Both differences are highly statistically significant (p<0.001). Unlike the government’s success as an appealing party, our findings did not support a similar pro-corporate effect. In cases not involving the government, the highest rate of review by litigant pair in pairs with more than four cases was 30.8% (4 of 13) in cases involving corporate plaintiff appeals of losses below.
Another principal finding of our study is that sentencing cases dominated the criminal docket and that criminal cases predominated over civil cases. In 413 of 946 (43.7%), discretionary criminal appeals sentencing was the only basis for appeal. Also, in 691 of 1,035 (66.8%) mandatory criminal appeals, sentencing was the only basis for appeal.
The article concludes with a discussion of the study’s results. Our findings suggest partial departure by the ISC from the requirements of discretionary appeal, laid down in the landmark case of Chenion Haifa v. Matzat Or2. According to the rules set in Chenion Haifa, the most cited precedent in Israeli case law, the court should grant discretionary appeal only when there are significant legal or public issues at stake (exceeding the interests of the litigating parties). The result reached by the lower court—whether correct or erroneous, desirable or undesirable—is immaterial to the decision on the matter of granting a discretionary appeal. While the low percentage of cases in which the ISC granted review indicates partial compliance with the Chenion Haifa ruling, the exceedingly high reversal rate among the cases in which the ISC granted review indicates deviance regarding the irrelevance of lower court mistakes. Unless district courts tend to systematically err in important cases in a direction with which the ISC disagrees, there is no ex ante reason to think that important cases will generate reversal rates as high as the ones observed.
Another point to note, in light of the results of the study, is that our findings generally correspond with the results of prior studies, conducted on other appellate courts, which also demonstrated substantial differences in appellate case outcomes as a function of jurisdictional source. For example, in a study of approximately 7,000 U.S. state supreme court opinions issued in 2003, Eisenberg and Miller report an aggregate reversal rate of 28.1% in mandatory cases. In discretionary jurisdiction cases, the aggregate reversal rate was 51.6%. Reversal rates in federal appellate court cases leading to opinions are reportedly about one-third. A study covering one-hundred years (1870 to 1970) with a sample of approximately 6,000 opinions from sixteen U.S. state supreme courts reported a mandatory-jurisdiction case reversal rate of 36.8% in published opinions. That study showed a discretionary case reversal rate of 50%. Reversal rates in our study did not substantially differ from analogous U.S. state court cases except in discretionary jurisdiction civil cases, in which we found the ISC’s reversal rate to be higher than U.S. state courts. Comparison of reversal rates across countries can only be suggestive, of course, due to procedural and structural differences.
Our study also confirms results reported by previous studies of the ISC. The results reported in the 1996 Shachar-Gross study 3 support our finding as to the pro-government effect. This study, which included 7,147 ISC cases—representing 40% of all cases published in the years 1948–1994—reported a variance in reversal rates of trial rulings between State and non-State actors. In criminal appeals, the State secured a reversal of 70.1% of the cases it appealed. Criminal defendants, in contrast, secured a reversal of only 34.9% of the cases reported. In civil appeals, reversal rates in appeals by non-State actors—whether plaintiffs or defendants at the trial court level—against the State were 31.2%. Reversal rates in appeals by the State were 53%.4 Our findings as to the absence of pro-corporate effect align with Dotan’s previous study of the ISC, in its function as High Court of Justice—namely, as a court of first instance for judicial review of cases involving a dispute with an agency of the State. The Dotan 1999 article reported that, in litigation before the Israeli High Court of Justice, “haves” (corporations) enjoyed only a limited advantage in litigation outcomes over “have nots” (comprised of welfare service customers, immigrants, disabled individuals, and petitioners that are exempt from the duty to pay court fees). Moreover, the Dotan study also reported that when “have nots” were represented by legal counsel, the corporations did not display any advantage whatsoever.5 Our findings portray a similar picture with respect to the ISC’s appellate function.![]()
Acknowledgments:
Eisenberg is the Henry Allen Mark Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, and Adjunct Professor of Statistical Sciences, Cornell University; Fisher is a senior lecturer at the Buchmann Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University; Rosen-Zvi is a senior lecturer at the Buchmann Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University.6
This editorial is based on the article, Theodore Eisenberg, Talia Fisher, & Issi Rosen-Zvi, Israel’s Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction: An Empirical Study, 96 CORNELL L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2011).
Copyright © 2011 Cornell Law Review.
- The study was restricted to the appellate function of the ISC. It does not relate to the ISC’s additional function as “High Court of Justice”—as a court of first instance for judicial review of cases involving a dispute with an agency of the State. ↩
- C.A. 103/82 Chenion Haifa v. Matzat Or P.D. 36(3) 123 (1982) ↩
- Yoram Shachar & Miron Gross, Acceptance and Rejection of Appeals to the Supreme Court: Quantitative Analyses, 13 LEGAL STUD. 329, 335-338 (1996) (in Hebrew). ↩
- Id. While the findings of our study seem compatible with the findings of the Shachar-Gross study, one must proceed with caution in comparing the two studies. The studies were conducted using different methodologies and on very different databases. Our study included all supreme court cases, both published and unpublished, whereas the Shachar-Gross study referred to 40% of published cases. ↩
- Yoav Dotan, Do the ‘Haves’ Still Come Out Ahead? Resource Inequalities in Ideological Courts: The Case of the Israeli High Court of Justice, 33 L. & SOC’Y REV. 1059, 1077 (1999). ↩
- We thank Na’ama Schlam for her invaluable research assistance, for her insightful comments and for coordinating the work with the students in a superb manner. We are also grateful to Efrat Zilberbush, Na’ama Daniel, Nitzan Ilani, and Gadi Ezra for their assistance in collecting the data. For excellent comments and suggestions, we thank Daphne Barak-Erez, Ariel Porat and Yoram Shachar. This Article was supported in part by a research grant from Cegla Center for Interdisciplinary Research of the Law at Tel Aviv University. ↩
More SCOTUS Action on Personal Jurisdiction via Summary Dispositions
Professor Charles Campbell at Faulkner University, Jones School of Law was kind enough to share the following information:
Yesterday, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated, and remanded one personal jurisdiction case, Dow Chemical Canada ULC v. Fandino, No. 10-250, to the California 2nd District Court of Appeals, for reconsideration in light of Nicastro. The Court denied certiorari in four other personal jurisdiction cases:
Roberts v. Kauffman Racing Equipment, L.L.C., No. 10-617;
Clemens v. McNamee, No. 10-966;
Pirelli Pneus LTDA v. Gunn, No. 10-1004; and
Abbyy Production, LLC v. Nuance Communications, Inc., No. 10-1019.
Roberts and Clemens both involved alleged defamation and Calder v. Jones. Pirelli was a stream-of-commerce case involving an allegedly defective motorcycle tire. In Abbyy, the Federal Circuit upheld personal jurisdiction over a Russian software developer based on the developer electronically shipping a master copy of software to a nonexclusive licensee in California.
Today’s order list is here. SCOTUSblog has a bit more information in its most recent “hold and relist watch” post, if anyone is interested.
Yesterday, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated, and remanded one personal jurisdiction case, Dow Chemical Canada ULC v. Fandino, No. 10-250, to the California 2nd District Court of Appeals, for reconsideration in light of Nicastro. The Court denied certiorari in four other personal jurisdiction cases:
Roberts v. Kauffman Racing Equipment, L.L.C., No. 10-617;
Clemens v. McNamee, No. 10-966;
Pirelli Pneus LTDA v. Gunn, No. 10-1004; and
Abbyy Production, LLC v. Nuance Communications, Inc., No. 10-1019.
Roberts and Clemens both involved alleged defamation and Calder v. Jones. Pirelli was a stream-of-commerce case involving an allegedly defective motorcycle tire. In Abbyy, the Federal Circuit upheld personal jurisdiction over a Russian software developer based on the developer electronically shipping a master copy of software to a nonexclusive licensee in California.
Today’s order list is here. SCOTUSblog has a bit more information in its most recent “hold and relist watch” post, if anyone is interested.
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SCOTUS Decides Goodyear
The Supreme Court has issued a unanimous opinion in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, rejecting the claim that general jurisdiction can be asserted over a foreign corporation whose product caused harm outside of the forum state but who also has products that reach the forum state through the stream of commerce. Here is an excerpt from the Syllabus:
Held: Petitioners were not amenable to suit in North Carolina on claims unrelated to any activity of petitioners in the forum State. Pp. 6–14.
(a) The Fourteenth Amendment ’s Due Process Clause sets the outer boundaries of a state tribunal’s authority to proceed against a defendant. The pathmarking decision of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 , provides that state courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant who has “certain minimum contacts with [the State] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Id. , at 316. Endeavoring to give specific content to the “fair play and substantial justice” concept, the Court in International Shoe classified cases involving out-of-state corporate defendants. First, the Court recognized that jurisdiction could be asserted where the corporation’s in-state activity is “continuous and systematic” and gave rise to the episode-in-suit. Id., at 317. It also observed that the commission of “single or occasional acts” in a State may be sufficient to render a corporation answerable in that State with respect to those acts, though not with respect to matters unrelated to the forum connections. Id. , at 318. These two categories compose what is now known as “specific jurisdiction.” Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall , 466 U. S. 408 , n. 8. International Shoe distinguished from cases that fit within the “specific jurisdiction” categories, “instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a state [are] so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.” 326 U. S., at 318. Adjudicatory authority so grounded is now called “general jurisdiction.” Helicopteros, 466 U. S., at 414, n. 9. Since International Shoe , this Court’s decisions have elaborated primarily on circumstances that warrant the exercise of specific jurisdiction. In only two decisions postdating International Shoe has this Court considered whether an out-of-state corporate defendant’s in-state contacts were sufficiently “continuous and systematic” to justify the exercise of general jurisdiction over claims unrelated to those contacts: Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co. , 342 U. S. 437 ; and Helicopteros , 466 U. S. 408 . Pp. 6–9.
(b) Petitioners lack “the kind of continuous and systematic general business contacts” necessary to allow North Carolina to entertain a suit against them unrelated to anything that connects them to the State. Helicopteros , 466 U. S., at 416. The stream-of-commerce cases on which the North Carolina court relied relate to exercises of specific jurisdiction in products liability actions, in which a nonresident defendant, acting outside the forum, places in the stream of commerce a product that ultimately causes harm inside the forum. Many state long-arm statutes authorize courts to exercise specific jurisdiction over manufacturers when the events in suit, or some of them, occurred within the forum State. The North Carolina court’s stream-of-commerce analysis elided the essential difference between case-specific and general jurisdiction. Flow of a manufacturer’s products into the forum may bolster an affiliation germane to specific jurisdiction, see, e.g. , World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson , 444 U. S. 286 ; but ties serving to bolster the exercise of specific jurisdiction do not warrant a determination that, based on those ties, the forum has general jurisdiction over a defendant. A corporation’s “continuous activity of some sorts within a state,” International Shoe instructed, “is not enough to support the demand that the corporation be amenable to suits unrelated to that activity.” 326 U. S., at 318.
The opinion of the Court is available here.
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SCOTUS "Decides" Nicastro
The Supreme Court has decided J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, No. 09-1343. Unfortunately, the Court did not resolve the issue left unresolved in Asahi, namely what is required of a defendant who places a product in the stream of commerce to subject it to jurisdiction in a state where the product causes harm. Justice Kennedy authored an opinion in which only three other Justices joined, embracing the O'Connor approach from Asahi. Breyer and Alito agreed that there could be no jurisdiction in the case but declined to join Kennedy's opinion.
Here is an excerpt from the Syllabus of the case:
Justice Kennedy , joined by The Chief Justice, Justice Scalia , and Justice Thomas , concluded that because J. McIntyre never engaged in any activities in New Jersey that revealed an intent to invoke or benefit from the protection of the State’s laws, New Jersey is without power to adjudge the company’s rights and liabilities, and its exercise of jurisdiction would violate due process. Pp. 4–12.
Here is an excerpt from the Syllabus of the case:
Justice Kennedy , joined by The Chief Justice, Justice Scalia , and Justice Thomas , concluded that because J. McIntyre never engaged in any activities in New Jersey that revealed an intent to invoke or benefit from the protection of the State’s laws, New Jersey is without power to adjudge the company’s rights and liabilities, and its exercise of jurisdiction would violate due process. Pp. 4–12.
(a) Due process protects the defendant’s right not to be coerced except by lawful judicial power. A court may subject a defendant to judgment only when the defendant has sufficient contacts with the sovereign “such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” International Shoe Co. v. Washington , 326 U. S. 310 . Freeform fundamental fairness notions divorced from traditional practice cannot transform a judgment rendered without authority into law. As a general rule, the sovereign’s exercise of power requires some act by which the defendant “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Hanson v. Denckla , 357 U. S. 235 . In cases like this one, it is the defendant’s purposeful availment that makes jurisdiction consistent with “fair play and substantial justice” notions. No “stream-of-commerce” doctrine can displace that general rule for products-liability cases.
The rules and standards for determining state jurisdiction over an absent party have been unclear because of decades-old questions left open in Asahi. The imprecision arising from Asahi , for the most part, results from its statement of the relation between jurisdiction and the “stream of commerce.” That concept, like other metaphors, has its deficiencies as well as its utilities. It refers to the movement of goods from manufacturers through distributors to consumers, yet beyond that descriptive purpose its meaning is far from exact. A defendant’s placement of goods into commerce “with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers within the forum State” may indicate purposeful availment. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson , 444 U. S. 286 . But that does not amend the general rule of personal jurisdiction. The principal inquiry in cases of this sort is whether the defendant’s activities manifest an intention to submit to the power of a sovereign. See, e.g., Hanson , supra , at 253. In Asahi , Justice Brennan’s concurrence (joined by three other Justices) discarded the central concept of sovereign authority in favor of fairness and foreseeability considerations on the theory that the defendant’s ability to anticipate suit is the touchstone of jurisdiction. 480 U. S., at 117. However, Justice O’Connor’s lead opinion (also for four Justices) stated that “[t]he ‘substantial connection’ between the defendant and the forum State necessary for a finding of minimum contacts must come about by an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.” Id., at 112. Since Asahi, the courts have sought to reconcile the competing opinions. But Justice Brennan’s rule based on general notions of fairness and foreseeability is inconsistent with the premises of lawful judicial power under this Court’s precedents. Today’s conclusion that the authority to subject a defendant to judgment depends on purposeful availment is consistent with Justice O’Connor’s Asahi opinion. Pp. 4–10.
(b) Nicastro has not established that J. McIntyre engaged in conduct purposefully directed at New Jersey. The company had no office in New Jersey; it neither paid taxes nor owned property there; and it neither advertised in, nor sent any employees to, the State. Indeed, the trial court found that petitioner did not have a single contact with the State apart from the fact that the machine in question ended up there. Neither these facts, nor the three on which Nicastro centered his jurisdictional claim, show that J. McIntyre purposefully availed itself of the New Jersey market. Pp. 10–12.
The opinions in the case may be downloaded by clicking here
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Unbundling Risk
Lee Anne Fennell
When individuals and households select products, services, or endeavors, they are usually making a bundled choice that comes with a certain level of risk exposure or insurance protection built in. Buying a house? You’re also buying a hefty dose of local housing market risk, for better or worse.1 Shopping for a car or a kitchen appliance? You’ll get an insurance policy along with it, and perhaps a lottery ticket as well, courtesy of the tort system2—but you’ll pay for those perks, and they’re not optional. Deciding whether to invest in a cutting-edge career, live the life of an artist, or take a steady job at a large firm? The choice you make will determine not only how you will spend your working days but also your vulnerability to income fluctuations. Similar examples abound. You can modulate your exposure to risk, but often only by changing what you buy or do. Aside from a few varieties of insurance, free-standing or unbundled risk adjustments can be hard to come by.
The menu of risk-customization opportunities available to individuals and households is not only quite limited, but also exhibits puzzling gaps and inconsistencies. Homeowners can easily insure their homes against fire but cannot readily insure against local housing market fluctuations that carry a similar potential to gut their investments. Parents routinely forgo purchasing life insurance for their minor children but cannot avoid carrying implicit insurance on them through the tort system. It is easy for people to hold onto the right to a risky future income stream but often hard to alienate a share of it in exchange for a sum certain. And so on.
These gaps in risk markets have not escaped notice, and academics and entrepreneurs have long been interested in finding creative ways to fill them. The result has been a rich literature advancing new ideas for rearranging risk within situated contexts, as well as a variety of innovative business models. In Unbundling Risk, I seek neither to invent nor to advocate for new risk-shifting devices. Instead, I explore questions surrounding risk unbundling itself, including the optimal amount of stickiness in society’s default risk allocations, the effects of heterogeneity in risk arrangements, and the implications (cognitive and otherwise) of starting from one risk baseline rather than another. The answers implicate both law and policy, given the government’s role in setting the rules for risk rearrangement among private entities and in directly delivering risk protection. As scholarly and entrepreneurial interest in risk innovations intensifies, such questions will become increasingly pressing. Unbundling Risk provides a framework for answering them.
Suppose that when making a purchase or undertaking an activity, people were routinely asked, in essence, “Would you like risk with that?” If everyone’s answer to this question would be identical in a given context, then it might not seem worth asking; the product or endeavor could simply embed the universally preferred amount of risk or insurance. Indeed, in some cases the question might seem absurd—taking on risk is the entire point (think of casino gambling).3 But in many other cases, activities or goods may be consumed not because of the risk profile they present, but in spite of it. Alternatively, otherwise attractive choices may be avoided by some individuals solely because of the risk or insurance with which they are bundled. Significantly, people seem to vary in their tolerance and taste for risk. There can be gains from shifting risk to those persons or entities who are in a better position to bear it, as through diversification, or who can reduce it by undertaking efforts on dimensions that lie under their control.
People are also likely to be heterogeneous in the degree to which they value monetary compensation for certain kinds of nonpecuniary losses, such as the death of a minor child. Because these losses do not typically increase the need for or marginal utility from money, people might prefer shifting money from the state of the world in which the child has died to the one in which the child is still alive. Yet, as commentators have observed, the implicit insurance provided through the tort system does the opposite by effectively extracting premiums from the family when the child is alive and returning a larger amount when the child has died. On this account, the implicit insurance may be utility reducing. Making insurance for such losses wholly unavailable might also be a mistake, however, given the various ways that people use insurance to allocate utility across states of the world.4 For example, some recent research suggests that, at least where objects of sentimental value are concerned, insurance payouts may serve a “consolation” function.5
Against the advantages of customization must be weighed a number of costs. Some risk rearrangements impose costs on other people or on individuals’ own future selves; thus, the law might prohibit people from undoing various forms of social insurance. Other costs may flow directly from heterogeneity in risk arrangements, as where allowing people with private information to elect coverage produces an adverse-selection dynamic. Where markets fail to offer risk customization in the absence of a legal ban, the explanation might be that a given risk rearrangement is simply unsustainable, whether due to moral hazard, adverse selection, or otherwise. Yet existing patterns of risk-rearrangement opportunities and gaps cannot be easily explained by reference to these considerations, raising the possibility that other factors, such as lack of familiarity or framing, may be implicated.
To see this point, it is helpful to first classify the sorts of risk moves that people might make. From a given individual’s perspective, there are four basic possibilities, which I collectively refer to as risk/expected value exchanges (REVEs). To see them, consider the following colloquy between an individual, Ida, and a talking urn that contains ninety-nine black balls and one red ball.
Urn: C’mon, Ida, take a draw. Maybe you’ll get the red ball!
Ida: And if I do?
Urn: Well, that depends on the consequences that are set for the drawing. For example, today’s red ball comes with the following consequence: “$1 million cash.” But yesterday’s was “one broken arm.” And you don’t want to know about last week. For each drawing, there’s a little ticket attached to the red ball, metaphorically speaking.6
Ida: Who attaches these consequences?
Urn: Oh, the law, or nature, or society.
Ida: Can they be changed?
Urn: Yes and no. You can detach monetary consequences or attach monetary consequences, at the right price—at least in theory.
Ida: So for today’s drawing, you say the red ball gets me $1 million. What if I want to make it $2 million?
Urn: You’d need to buy an “upside event-enhancing REVE”—what you might call a gravy gamble. That would cost you $10,000, plus an administrative cut for whoever is selling these things.
Ida: What if I would rather get $10,000 myself, no matter which ball I draw out?
Urn: Then you’re talking about an “upside event-detracting REVE”—a gravy giveup. You’d sell the red ball ticket to someone who pays you its expected value, less an administrative increment.
Ida: So let’s say it was “broken arm day” instead.
Urn: You can’t void the broken arm ticket. But you could add a ticket that would pay your medical costs and let you buy things that would take your mind off your broken arm.
Ida: Insurance.
Urn: If you say so. I’d call it a “downside event-enhancing REVE,” or ditch coverage. It will cost you the expected value of the payment you’d receive, plus an administrative increment. Or, if you’d prefer ditch exposure, you could go with a “downside event-detracting REVE.”
Ida: And what would ditch exposure mean on broken arm day? Another broken arm?
Urn: Well, that’s hard to arrange. But you could get a significant fine to go with your broken arm!
Ida: That sounds unpleasant.
Urn: Well, that’s why you’d get paid for attaching that consequence. You might enjoy the money more when your arm is in good shape than when it is broken, right?
Ida: Maybe so. For now, I need an “upside event-detracting REVE” for that million dollar drawing.
Urn: Yeah, good luck with that.
As the urn’s sarcasm suggests, event-detracting REVEs tend to be rare, even though certain kinds of event-enhancing REVEs—insurance and lotteries—are readily available. It is not possible to explain this difference by saying that society does not want people to be exposed to unremediated losses or “ditches,” because the law often allows people to refrain from purchasing insurance in contexts where the result could be an unremediated loss. Likewise, as the taxonomy above suggests, some event-detracting REVEs simply truncate possible gains, which would not seem especially normatively troubling. Of course, there are many other reasons that particular REVEs might not emerge, or might be the subject of legal bans. But it is at least worth investigating whether the particular mix of risk-rearrangement opportunities that currently exists is more a function of framing and tradition than a reflection of real normative differences.
My point here is about consistency, not about the overall level of risk-rearrangement opportunities that may be optimal. Nonetheless, thinking carefully about the prospects for unbundling risk may reveal places where minor tweaks could alleviate concerns that may have made certain risk transactions seem unworkable. For example, one of the most discussed event-detracting REVEs is the sale of unmatured tort claims—potential future claims by people who have not yet sustained an injury.7 Here, one concern is that people will myopically choose an upfront payment in exchange for their future legal claims when it is not in their best interests to do so.8 But if risk customization is the goal, payment arrangements could be deferred or otherwise structured to present expected value equivalents that do not raise these cognitive risks.
Important in this discussion is the role of government as a risk manager that may also be seeking to accomplish a variety of other goals, from protecting people from cognitive pitfalls to redistributing resources among people who enter the risk pool with different attributes. Recognizing the full complement of possible risk moves may open up new policy opportunities by offering innovative combinations of risk defaults and levels of risk stickiness. If nothing else, awareness of the available risk moves can help to make the background risk conditions more transparent and to reveal them for what they are—socially constructed arrangements that could be otherwise.
In The Lottery in Babylon, Jorge Luis Borges conjures a pervasive societal system of chance-taking orchestrated by an ominous “Company” that delivers favorable and unfavorable outcomes in kind to all the inhabitants of the city.9 The arrangements seem alien, even monstrous. Yet at the end of the story, the reader learns that some inhabitants claim “the Company has never existed and never will,” while others assert that “it makes no difference whether one affirms or denies the reality of the shadowy corporation, because Babylon is nothing but an infinite game of chance.”10 This revelation brings a shock of recognition, prompting the reader to consider the ways in which variance is embedded in life, as well as the role of background institutional and social arrangements in determining how individuals will confront it. In a very different way, my Article hopes to invite a similar set of inquiries into risk baselines and the choices society affords for moving away from them.![]()
Acknowledgments:
Copyright © 2011 Duke Law Journal
Lee Anne Fennell is a Professor at the University of Chicago Law School
This Legal Workshop Editorial is based on the following article:
Unbundling Risk, 60 Duke L.J. 1285 (2011).
- See William A. Fischel, Why Are There NIMBYs?, 77 LAND ECON. 144, 146 (2001) (analogizing the purchase of a home to the purchase of undiversified stock in the local housing market). ↩
- See Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Damages: The Multiplier Principle and Its Alternatives, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2185, 2230 (1999) (analogizing a punitive damages multiplier to a lottery ticket). ↩
- Barbara H. Fried, Ex Ante/Ex Post, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 123, 140, 144 (2003). ↩
- See, e.g., Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1832 (1995). ↩
- See Christopher K. Hsee & Howard C. Kunreuther, The Affection Effect in Insurance Decisions, 20 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 141, 145–46 (2000). ↩
- HOWARD KUNREUTHER, RALPH GINSBERG, LOUIS MILLER, PHILIP SAGI, PAUL SLOVIC, BRADLEY BORKAN & NORMAN KATZ, DISASTER INSURANCE PROTECTION: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS 47 (1978) (describing insurance and similar devices as “tickets that can be cashed in for money if certain states of nature occur”). ↩
- See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 383, 383–87 (1989). ↩
- Alan Schwartz, Commentary on “Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort Claims”: A Long Way Yet to Go, 75 VA. L. REV. 423, 425 (1989). ↩
- Jorge Luis Borges, The Lottery in Babylon, SUR, Jan. 1941, reprinted in COLLECTED FICTIONS 101 (Andrew Hurley trans., 1998). ↩
- Id. at 106. ↩
Posted in Decision Making, Duke Law Journal, insurance, Law Review Article, Legal Philosophy & Critical Theory, Risk Assessment
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Disaster Mythology and the Law
More than five years have passed since Hurricane Katrina devastated the Gulf Coast, yet images from Katrina’s aftermath continue to haunt the American mind. Many of the most shocking and disturbing images that remain with us today are not from photographs or news footage, but images constructed and seared in our collective consciousness by widespread and seemingly credible reports of chaos, anarchy, violence, and depravity enveloping New Orleans in Katrina’s ruinous wake.
New Orleans was, we were told, a city descending into anarchy—a place, according to the New Orleans Police Superintendent, where “little babies were getting raped” in the Superdome, a shelter of last resort1; a place, as New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin recounted to Oprah Winfrey, where hurricane survivors had descended into an “almost animalistic state” after days of seeing dead bodies and “watching hooligans killing people, raping people.”2
The mainstream press—including some of the most respected media outlets—built on official accounts of lawlessness to paint an unrelenting picture of bedlam and atrocities in New Orleans. According to a column in the New York Times, post-Katrina New Orleans was “a snake pit of anarchy, death, looting, raping, marauding thugs, suffering innocents, a shattered infrastructure, a gutted police force, insufficient troop levels and criminally negligent government planning.”3 The Financial Times of London likewise reported that, at the Convention Center, another shelter of last resort, “girls and boys were raped in the dark and had their throats cut and bodies were stuffed in the kitchens while looters and madmen exchanged fire with weapons they had looted.”4 London’s Evening Standard took a more literary tack, alluding to The Lord of the Flies in its descriptions of New Orleans.5 Fox News described “cops arriving on the scene, armed and ready to take on the armed thugs,” and “[t]hugs shooting at rescue crews.”6 A Fox News correspondent also asserted “there are so many murders taking place” and “[t]here are rapes, other violent crimes taking place in New Orleans.”7
When the media was not describing New Orleans as the anarchic turf of marauding thugs, it characterized New Orleans as a war zone. The war being fought was not with nature—as one might assume—but between Katrina’s victims and their would-be rescuers. The Los Angeles Times, for example, reported in its lead news story that “National Guard troops took positions on rooftops, scanning for snipers and armed mobs as seething crowds of refugees milled below, desperate to flee. Gunfire crackled in the distance.”8 In an article titled Troops Back from Iraq Find Another War Zone, and subtitled In New Orleans, ‘It’s Like Baghdad on a Bad Day,’ the Washington Post reported that “just the smell and feel of a war zone in the city put the soldiers on edge.”9 CNN’s Wolf Blitzer said of the National Guard’s arrival in New Orleans, “eight convoys and troops are on the ground at last in a place being described as a lawless, deadly war zone.”10
These images of anarchy and war were compelling in Katrina’s immediate aftermath, and they endure even today. But they were not real. The reality on the ground was far different from the pictures painted in the press. Although the living conditions in the Superdome and Convention Center were appalling—and those who had taken refuge there suffered greatly for want of food, water, and decent sanitation—the media and public officials greatly exaggerated the amount of lawlessness and violence occurring in New Orleans. Almost a month after Katrina made landfall, major news outlets retracted much of their previous reporting, admitting that the reports of violence and crime were largely unsubstantiated.
Media mea culpas notwithstanding, why were public officials and the media so eager to report, and the public so quick to believe, tales of horrific violence and anarchy in post-Katrina New Orleans? While these reports did not conform to the truth, they did conform to an enduring myth about the behavior of individuals in the aftermath of natural disasters: that antisocial behaviors such as violence and looting are common human reactions to natural disasters.
Sociologists have long identified substantial disconnects between public perceptions of post-disaster human behavior and the empirical assessments of that behavior. The narrative of post-disaster behavior that resonates in the media and with most people reads like a typical disaster movie script: disaster victims are plunged into a lawless, chaotic world of looting, violence, and human depravity, where they either “flee in panic”—scrambling over other victims in a heartless attempt to save themselves—or curl up in fetal position, paralyzed by fear and unable to muster the will to go on. Victims are rescued not by their own wits and ingenuity but by a trusted, commanding hero who rises above base human nature and steps into the void to lead and save the helpless masses.
The narrative of post-disaster human behavior found in sociological studies is both far less dramatic and far more encouraging: disaster survivors engage in overwhelmingly prosocial behavior and victims-turned-resourceful-first-responders rationally assess danger and work assiduously to save their neighbors and communities. Given the prevalence of disaster mythology, it is disturbing—but hardly surprising—that the public narrative of post‑Katrina New Orleans took a page from a disaster-movie script rather than a sociology textbook (other than the much bemoaned and conspicuous absence of a strong, authoritative hero who saved the day).
While these “disaster myths” have been the subject of intensive investigation by sociology scholars, they have been wholly neglected in legal scholarship. Yet these myths have important implications for disaster law and policy. If sociologists are correct that many widely shared assumptions about post-disaster human behavior are myths with little basis in fact, and that these myths exert a powerful hold on the American mind, we might expect that existing laws reflect and perhaps even perpetuate these myths. Moreover, if both existing laws and the implementation of those laws are grounded in myths rather than in the reality of human behavior in disaster situations, then we might also expect that current disaster laws and policies are suboptimal, likely mismatched to the task of minimizing community and societal disruption and the concomitant human suffering. Even those laws that do not necessarily reflect disaster mythology may, nonetheless, allow responding officials the discretion to implement suboptimal response measures that do reflect that mythology. The myths and their consequences, therefore, are eminently relevant to the ongoing development of both the disaster laws on the books and the structures in place for implementing those laws in times of emergency.
My article is the first to address the impact of disaster mythology on American disaster law. Focusing on the disaster myth of widespread looting and violence, I suggest that this myth has engendered a legal and policy structure that frames natural disaster response too much as a law enforcement, rather than a humanitarian, problem. From calls to expand the role of the military in disaster law enforcement, to diversion of police from search and rescue missions to antilooting patrols, to disaster-spurred restrictions on movement, to the passage of looting laws, we overemphasize law enforcement concerns and security risks at the expense of humanitarian efforts to provide needed aid to disaster survivors, to allow survivors themselves to help their neighbors and rebuild their lives, and to mitigate harms from future disasters.
My article undertakes a careful evaluation of these consequences of the myth of looting and violence for our system of legal response to disasters. Initially, I examine three contexts in which the disaster mythology of looting and violence substantially affects the development or implementation of legal disaster response and for which it may be advisable to legally constrain, in advance, the discretion of politically accountable decision makers in order to counter the effects of disaster mythology.
First, disaster mythology may influence the scope and form of military involvement in disaster response by shaping official perceptions about whether the legal prerequisites for military intervention have been satisfied. More specifically, the mythology may make it more likely that the President will deploy federal troops in a law enforcement capacity by invoking the Insurrection Act,11 and—in the absence of that invocation—less likely that the President will be willing to commit federal troops to humanitarian missions. Second, belief in exaggerated reports of looting and violence distorts implementation of response priorities outlined in disaster plans. Third, exaggerated fears of looting and violence lead public officials to implement restrictions on freedom and freedom of movement, many of which are authorized in state disaster laws, that may be counterproductive to relief efforts by, for example, delaying return of evacuees to their homes. Such fears may also encourage excessive use of force by police. Because reports perpetuating the myth of widespread looting and violence seem to peak during the immediate-response phase and then begin to recede, I argue that amending disaster legislation and emergency-response plans during times of calm to limit official discretion to overemphasize security risks in immediate-response decisions may help counter the deleterious effects of the myth.
The aftermath of Hurricane Katrina demonstrates this need to counteract the influence of the myth by constraining official discretion. After Katrina, exaggerated reports of looting and violence, spurred by disaster mythology, hampered response efforts at every level of government. In response to the overblown reports of looting and violence, President Bush considered invoking the Insurrection Act to federalize the National Guard and to invest those troops and federal regular troops with law enforcement authority to respond to the reported lawlessness. Then, when political considerations dissuaded the President from taking these actions, concern that federal troops would encounter law-and-order difficulties on the ground apparently delayed deployment of federal troops to New Orleans to perform humanitarian missions, such as search and rescue.
Moreover, the exaggerated reports of looting and violence had concrete, detrimental effects on the prioritization and implementation of immediate-response measures called for in federal, state, and local disaster plans. New Orleans mayor Ray Nagin diverted 1,500 New Orleans police from search and rescue missions to antilooting patrol, a decision that may have exacerbated Katrina’s death toll, which eventually reached at least 828 in New Orleans alone.
Additionally, the rumors of violence and gang activity in shelters of last resort, such as the Superdome and Convention Center, delayed delivery of critical aid to hurricane survivors. Rather than delivering supplies to those shelters as quickly as the provisions became available, responders waited until military escorts could arrive to accompany the deliveries. For example, after amassing supplies of MREs and other food to deliver to the Convention Center, the National Guard assembled an armed escort of one thousand soldiers and two hundred fifty police officers. National Guard Lieutenant Colonel Jacques Thibodeaux had been told to expect “lawlessness, no food and water, desperation.” Indeed, the caravan was “expecting a war zone,” reported Mark Smith, spokesman for the Louisiana Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness.12 The caravan was greeted instead by cheering crowds, the Convention Center was secured within thirty minutes, and a search of all nineteen thousand people produced only thirteen weapons.
Myth-influenced reports of massive looting and horrific violence in Katrina’s aftermath also led local officials to impose drastic restrictions on basic freedoms, including freedom of movement. One of the most shocking examples of such restrictions was the decision by suburban police in Gretna, Louisiana to blockade one of the primary escape routes from New Orleans, the Crescent City Connection Bridge, to prevent survivors—whom they viewed as potential looters and rapists—from evacuating the city on foot and taking refuge in adjacent communities. Additionally, both New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin and Jefferson Parish President Aaron Broussard reportedly purported to declare martial law in their jurisdictions. Nagin apparently told police to “do ‘whatever it takes’” to restore law and order and said that “[m]artial [l]aw means that officers don’t have to worry about civil rights and Miranda rights in stopping the looters.”13 Such declarations may well have encouraged police to view Katrina survivors primarily as potential criminals and emboldened police in their use of excessive—even deadly—force in confronting those survivors they encountered on the streets.
Even in more mundane disasters, the myth of widespread looting and violence rears its head. Local officials often delay evacuees’ return to their homes until sufficient manpower is available to police the area for potential looting. Indeed, many state and local disaster plans specifically cite looting as a reason for continuing to secure the area after a disaster and as a factor to be considered in determining the timing of evacuee reentry. Likewise, local officials often impose curfews in disaster-stricken areas to forestall looting.
Consequently, I suggest that our legal system of disaster response should counter the deleterious effects of the disaster myth by limiting the discretion of federal and state officials to elevate law enforcement over humanitarian concerns. First, we should reject calls to expand the role of the military—particularly the federal military—in disaster law enforcement. Second, to prevent exaggerated fears of violence and looting from interfering with federal disaster aid, the federal Stafford Act’s14 provisions on major disaster assistance should be amended to preclude the President from delaying or withholding federal aid, including military humanitarian aid, based on unsubstantiated reports of looting and violence. Third, state and local disaster laws and plans likewise should be amended to prohibit prioritization of law enforcement over other response missions, to clearly establish the priority of life-saving over property protection, and to preclude delays in delivery of aid based on security concerns absent credible, reliable, verified evidence that such concerns are valid. Fourth, state disaster laws should also be amended to prevent invocation of inflated looting fears to justify restrictions on movement such as blockades, curfews, vague declarations of “martial law” that purport to suspend constitutional rights, and orders delaying evacuees’ return to their homes. These reforms will help limit the detrimental effects that the myth of looting and violence otherwise has on disaster response.
The next section of my article demonstrates that the disaster myth of looting and violence has spurred the adoption of many state laws criminalizing looting. Although looting laws may serve some limited functions, their passage diverts attention from more important legislative responses to disasters, such as the adoption of mitigation measures. Furthermore, such laws perpetuate the myth both by suggesting that looting is frequently a major problem and by failing to distinguish between antisocial looting (opportunistic criminal behavior preying on the vulnerabilities of other disaster victims) and arguably prosocial looting, or what sociologists describe as appropriating behavior (that is, disaster victims “requisitioning” needed survival supplies that are not otherwise readily available). By equating all post-disaster looting, these looting laws inflate the amount of perceived antisocial behavior. Such laws may even encourage vigilantism and overly aggressive law enforcement by entrenching the primacy and inviolability of private property rights during disasters. Therefore, I suggest that we should experiment with public education campaigns to reduce pressure on officials to adopt looting laws or, at least, to encourage adoption of looting laws that affirmatively grapple with the distinction between antisocial and prosocial looting.
Finally, I consider how the disaster myth of looting and violence affects the way in which we should structure the administrative agencies charged with disaster response. In particular, I suggest that, to facilitate rooting out the disaster myth and the overemphasis on law enforcement it spurs, both the federal and state governments should be wary of submerging agencies charged with mitigating and responding to natural disasters in larger homeland security agencies focused primarily on terrorism. Housing natural disaster response agencies in bureaucracies charged primarily with responding to terrorism risks will likely make it more difficult to reorient natural disaster response away from law enforcement and toward humanitarian concerns. Accordingly, the prevalence of the disaster myth should give us pause about continuing to house the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
The true nightmare of Katrina was not the anarchy and violence reported to have consumed the city; rather, it was the painfully slow and often misguided response—spurred in part by the disaster myth of widespread looting and violence—that compounded the suffering of Katrina’s victims and all but guaranteed that disaster would become catastrophe. If we are to avoid that nightmare scenario in future disasters, we must reform both the design and implementation of our disaster laws to avoid the overemphasis on security and law enforcement that the disaster myth encourages.
Moreover, by continuing the dialogue between disaster sociology and disaster law that this Article has begun, we can help ensure that our legal framework for natural disaster response is designed and implemented based on accurate assessments of post-disaster human behavior. As we take the necessary steps to counter the deleterious impact of disaster mythology on our legal system of disaster response, we will be better prepared to meet the challenge of minimizing human suffering in the face of future natural disasters that will surely come.![]()
Acknowledgments:
Lisa Grow Sun is an Associate Professor of Law at the J. Reuben Clark Law School at Brigham Young University.
This editorial is based on Lisa Grow Sun’s article, Lisa Grow Sun, Disaster Mythology and the Law, 96 CORNELL L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2011).
- Oprah Reports, Oprah.com (Sept. 6, 2005), http://www.oprah.com/slideshow/oprahshow/oprahshow1_ss_20050906/2. ↩
- Brian Thevenot, Myth-Making in New Orleans, Am. Journalism Rev., Dec. 2005–Jan. 2006, at 30, 34 (internal quotation marks omitted). ↩
- Maureen Dowd, Op-Ed., United States of Shame, N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 2005, at A21, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/03/opinion/03dowd.html?scp=1&sq=Maureen%20Dowd%20United%20States%20of%20Shame&st=cse. ↩
- Guy Dinmore, City of Rape, Rumour and Recrimination, Fin. Times, Sept. 5, 2005, at 7. ↩
- See Robert Mendick, Gang Rule and Rape in Hurricane Dome . . . It’s Like a Mad Max Movie, Evening Standard (London), Sept. 2, 2005, at 6 (“It was like something out of Lord Of The Flies—one minute everything is calm and civil, the next it descends into chaos.”). ↩
- Thevenot, supra note 2, at 33. ↩
- Id. ↩
- Ellen Barry et al., New Orleans Slides into Chaos; U.S. Scrambles to Send Troops, L.A. Times, Sept. 2, 2005, at 1. ↩
- Ann Scott Tyson, Troops Back from Iraq Find Another War Zone: In New Orleans, ‘It’s Like Baghdad on a Bad Day,’ Wash. Post, Sept. 6, 2005, at A10. ↩
- Jaime Omar Yassin, Demonizing the Victims of Katrina, Extra!, Nov.–Dec. 2005, http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=2793. ↩
- 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–335 (2006). ↩
- Katy Reckdahl, The Myths of New Orleans, Tucson Weekly, Aug. 24, 2006, http://www.tucsonweekly.com/tucson/the-myths-of-new-orleans/Content?oid=1085005 (internal quotation marks omitted). ↩
- Select Bipartisan Comm. to Investigate the Preparation for & Response to Hurricane Katrina, Supplementary Report, at 51 (2006), reprinted in, A Failure of Initiative, H.R. Rep. No. 109–377, app. 8, at 486 (2006). ↩
- 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5208 (2006). ↩
Disaster Mythology and the Law
More than five years have passed since Hurricane Katrina devastated the Gulf Coast, yet images from Katrina’s aftermath continue to haunt the American mind. Many of the most shocking and disturbing images that remain with us today are not from photographs or news footage, but images constructed and seared in our collective consciousness by widespread and seemingly credible reports of chaos, anarchy, violence, and depravity enveloping New Orleans in Katrina’s ruinous wake.
New Orleans was, we were told, a city descending into anarchy—a place, according to the New Orleans Police Superintendent, where “little babies were getting raped” in the Superdome, a shelter of last resort1; a place, as New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin recounted to Oprah Winfrey, where hurricane survivors had descended into an “almost animalistic state” after days of seeing dead bodies and “watching hooligans killing people, raping people.”2
The mainstream press—including some of the most respected media outlets—built on official accounts of lawlessness to paint an unrelenting picture of bedlam and atrocities in New Orleans. According to a column in the New York Times, post-Katrina New Orleans was “a snake pit of anarchy, death, looting, raping, marauding thugs, suffering innocents, a shattered infrastructure, a gutted police force, insufficient troop levels and criminally negligent government planning.”3 The Financial Times of London likewise reported that, at the Convention Center, another shelter of last resort, “girls and boys were raped in the dark and had their throats cut and bodies were stuffed in the kitchens while looters and madmen exchanged fire with weapons they had looted.”4 London’s Evening Standard took a more literary tack, alluding to The Lord of the Flies in its descriptions of New Orleans.5 Fox News described “cops arriving on the scene, armed and ready to take on the armed thugs,” and “[t]hugs shooting at rescue crews.”6 A Fox News correspondent also asserted “there are so many murders taking place” and “[t]here are rapes, other violent crimes taking place in New Orleans.”7
When the media was not describing New Orleans as the anarchic turf of marauding thugs, it characterized New Orleans as a war zone. The war being fought was not with nature—as one might assume—but between Katrina’s victims and their would-be rescuers. The Los Angeles Times, for example, reported in its lead news story that “National Guard troops took positions on rooftops, scanning for snipers and armed mobs as seething crowds of refugees milled below, desperate to flee. Gunfire crackled in the distance.”8 In an article titled Troops Back from Iraq Find Another War Zone, and subtitled In New Orleans, ‘It’s Like Baghdad on a Bad Day,’ the Washington Post reported that “just the smell and feel of a war zone in the city put the soldiers on edge.”9 CNN’s Wolf Blitzer said of the National Guard’s arrival in New Orleans, “eight convoys and troops are on the ground at last in a place being described as a lawless, deadly war zone.”10
These images of anarchy and war were compelling in Katrina’s immediate aftermath, and they endure even today. But they were not real. The reality on the ground was far different from the pictures painted in the press. Although the living conditions in the Superdome and Convention Center were appalling—and those who had taken refuge there suffered greatly for want of food, water, and decent sanitation—the media and public officials greatly exaggerated the amount of lawlessness and violence occurring in New Orleans. Almost a month after Katrina made landfall, major news outlets retracted much of their previous reporting, admitting that the reports of violence and crime were largely unsubstantiated.
Media mea culpas notwithstanding, why were public officials and the media so eager to report, and the public so quick to believe, tales of horrific violence and anarchy in post-Katrina New Orleans? While these reports did not conform to the truth, they did conform to an enduring myth about the behavior of individuals in the aftermath of natural disasters: that antisocial behaviors such as violence and looting are common human reactions to natural disasters.
Sociologists have long identified substantial disconnects between public perceptions of post-disaster human behavior and the empirical assessments of that behavior. The narrative of post-disaster behavior that resonates in the media and with most people reads like a typical disaster movie script: disaster victims are plunged into a lawless, chaotic world of looting, violence, and human depravity, where they either “flee in panic”—scrambling over other victims in a heartless attempt to save themselves—or curl up in fetal position, paralyzed by fear and unable to muster the will to go on. Victims are rescued not by their own wits and ingenuity but by a trusted, commanding hero who rises above base human nature and steps into the void to lead and save the helpless masses.
The narrative of post-disaster human behavior found in sociological studies is both far less dramatic and far more encouraging: disaster survivors engage in overwhelmingly prosocial behavior and victims-turned-resourceful-first-responders rationally assess danger and work assiduously to save their neighbors and communities. Given the prevalence of disaster mythology, it is disturbing—but hardly surprising—that the public narrative of post‑Katrina New Orleans took a page from a disaster-movie script rather than a sociology textbook (other than the much bemoaned and conspicuous absence of a strong, authoritative hero who saved the day).
While these “disaster myths” have been the subject of intensive investigation by sociology scholars, they have been wholly neglected in legal scholarship. Yet these myths have important implications for disaster law and policy. If sociologists are correct that many widely shared assumptions about post-disaster human behavior are myths with little basis in fact, and that these myths exert a powerful hold on the American mind, we might expect that existing laws reflect and perhaps even perpetuate these myths. Moreover, if both existing laws and the implementation of those laws are grounded in myths rather than in the reality of human behavior in disaster situations, then we might also expect that current disaster laws and policies are suboptimal, likely mismatched to the task of minimizing community and societal disruption and the concomitant human suffering. Even those laws that do not necessarily reflect disaster mythology may, nonetheless, allow responding officials the discretion to implement suboptimal response measures that do reflect that mythology. The myths and their consequences, therefore, are eminently relevant to the ongoing development of both the disaster laws on the books and the structures in place for implementing those laws in times of emergency.
My article is the first to address the impact of disaster mythology on American disaster law. Focusing on the disaster myth of widespread looting and violence, I suggest that this myth has engendered a legal and policy structure that frames natural disaster response too much as a law enforcement, rather than a humanitarian, problem. From calls to expand the role of the military in disaster law enforcement, to diversion of police from search and rescue missions to antilooting patrols, to disaster-spurred restrictions on movement, to the passage of looting laws, we overemphasize law enforcement concerns and security risks at the expense of humanitarian efforts to provide needed aid to disaster survivors, to allow survivors themselves to help their neighbors and rebuild their lives, and to mitigate harms from future disasters.
My article undertakes a careful evaluation of these consequences of the myth of looting and violence for our system of legal response to disasters. Initially, I examine three contexts in which the disaster mythology of looting and violence substantially affects the development or implementation of legal disaster response and for which it may be advisable to legally constrain, in advance, the discretion of politically accountable decision makers in order to counter the effects of disaster mythology.
First, disaster mythology may influence the scope and form of military involvement in disaster response by shaping official perceptions about whether the legal prerequisites for military intervention have been satisfied. More specifically, the mythology may make it more likely that the President will deploy federal troops in a law enforcement capacity by invoking the Insurrection Act,11 and—in the absence of that invocation—less likely that the President will be willing to commit federal troops to humanitarian missions. Second, belief in exaggerated reports of looting and violence distorts implementation of response priorities outlined in disaster plans. Third, exaggerated fears of looting and violence lead public officials to implement restrictions on freedom and freedom of movement, many of which are authorized in state disaster laws, that may be counterproductive to relief efforts by, for example, delaying return of evacuees to their homes. Such fears may also encourage excessive use of force by police. Because reports perpetuating the myth of widespread looting and violence seem to peak during the immediate-response phase and then begin to recede, I argue that amending disaster legislation and emergency-response plans during times of calm to limit official discretion to overemphasize security risks in immediate-response decisions may help counter the deleterious effects of the myth.
The aftermath of Hurricane Katrina demonstrates this need to counteract the influence of the myth by constraining official discretion. After Katrina, exaggerated reports of looting and violence, spurred by disaster mythology, hampered response efforts at every level of government. In response to the overblown reports of looting and violence, President Bush considered invoking the Insurrection Act to federalize the National Guard and to invest those troops and federal regular troops with law enforcement authority to respond to the reported lawlessness. Then, when political considerations dissuaded the President from taking these actions, concern that federal troops would encounter law-and-order difficulties on the ground apparently delayed deployment of federal troops to New Orleans to perform humanitarian missions, such as search and rescue.
Moreover, the exaggerated reports of looting and violence had concrete, detrimental effects on the prioritization and implementation of immediate-response measures called for in federal, state, and local disaster plans. New Orleans mayor Ray Nagin diverted 1,500 New Orleans police from search and rescue missions to antilooting patrol, a decision that may have exacerbated Katrina’s death toll, which eventually reached at least 828 in New Orleans alone.
Additionally, the rumors of violence and gang activity in shelters of last resort, such as the Superdome and Convention Center, delayed delivery of critical aid to hurricane survivors. Rather than delivering supplies to those shelters as quickly as the provisions became available, responders waited until military escorts could arrive to accompany the deliveries. For example, after amassing supplies of MREs and other food to deliver to the Convention Center, the National Guard assembled an armed escort of one thousand soldiers and two hundred fifty police officers. National Guard Lieutenant Colonel Jacques Thibodeaux had been told to expect “lawlessness, no food and water, desperation.” Indeed, the caravan was “expecting a war zone,” reported Mark Smith, spokesman for the Louisiana Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness.12 The caravan was greeted instead by cheering crowds, the Convention Center was secured within thirty minutes, and a search of all nineteen thousand people produced only thirteen weapons.
Myth-influenced reports of massive looting and horrific violence in Katrina’s aftermath also led local officials to impose drastic restrictions on basic freedoms, including freedom of movement. One of the most shocking examples of such restrictions was the decision by suburban police in Gretna, Louisiana to blockade one of the primary escape routes from New Orleans, the Crescent City Connection Bridge, to prevent survivors—whom they viewed as potential looters and rapists—from evacuating the city on foot and taking refuge in adjacent communities. Additionally, both New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin and Jefferson Parish President Aaron Broussard reportedly purported to declare martial law in their jurisdictions. Nagin apparently told police to “do ‘whatever it takes’” to restore law and order and said that “[m]artial [l]aw means that officers don’t have to worry about civil rights and Miranda rights in stopping the looters.”13 Such declarations may well have encouraged police to view Katrina survivors primarily as potential criminals and emboldened police in their use of excessive—even deadly—force in confronting those survivors they encountered on the streets.
Even in more mundane disasters, the myth of widespread looting and violence rears its head. Local officials often delay evacuees’ return to their homes until sufficient manpower is available to police the area for potential looting. Indeed, many state and local disaster plans specifically cite looting as a reason for continuing to secure the area after a disaster and as a factor to be considered in determining the timing of evacuee reentry. Likewise, local officials often impose curfews in disaster-stricken areas to forestall looting.
Consequently, I suggest that our legal system of disaster response should counter the deleterious effects of the disaster myth by limiting the discretion of federal and state officials to elevate law enforcement over humanitarian concerns. First, we should reject calls to expand the role of the military—particularly the federal military—in disaster law enforcement. Second, to prevent exaggerated fears of violence and looting from interfering with federal disaster aid, the federal Stafford Act’s14 provisions on major disaster assistance should be amended to preclude the President from delaying or withholding federal aid, including military humanitarian aid, based on unsubstantiated reports of looting and violence. Third, state and local disaster laws and plans likewise should be amended to prohibit prioritization of law enforcement over other response missions, to clearly establish the priority of life-saving over property protection, and to preclude delays in delivery of aid based on security concerns absent credible, reliable, verified evidence that such concerns are valid. Fourth, state disaster laws should also be amended to prevent invocation of inflated looting fears to justify restrictions on movement such as blockades, curfews, vague declarations of “martial law” that purport to suspend constitutional rights, and orders delaying evacuees’ return to their homes. These reforms will help limit the detrimental effects that the myth of looting and violence otherwise has on disaster response.
The next section of my article demonstrates that the disaster myth of looting and violence has spurred the adoption of many state laws criminalizing looting. Although looting laws may serve some limited functions, their passage diverts attention from more important legislative responses to disasters, such as the adoption of mitigation measures. Furthermore, such laws perpetuate the myth both by suggesting that looting is frequently a major problem and by failing to distinguish between antisocial looting (opportunistic criminal behavior preying on the vulnerabilities of other disaster victims) and arguably prosocial looting, or what sociologists describe as appropriating behavior (that is, disaster victims “requisitioning” needed survival supplies that are not otherwise readily available). By equating all post-disaster looting, these looting laws inflate the amount of perceived antisocial behavior. Such laws may even encourage vigilantism and overly aggressive law enforcement by entrenching the primacy and inviolability of private property rights during disasters. Therefore, I suggest that we should experiment with public education campaigns to reduce pressure on officials to adopt looting laws or, at least, to encourage adoption of looting laws that affirmatively grapple with the distinction between antisocial and prosocial looting.
Finally, I consider how the disaster myth of looting and violence affects the way in which we should structure the administrative agencies charged with disaster response. In particular, I suggest that, to facilitate rooting out the disaster myth and the overemphasis on law enforcement it spurs, both the federal and state governments should be wary of submerging agencies charged with mitigating and responding to natural disasters in larger homeland security agencies focused primarily on terrorism. Housing natural disaster response agencies in bureaucracies charged primarily with responding to terrorism risks will likely make it more difficult to reorient natural disaster response away from law enforcement and toward humanitarian concerns. Accordingly, the prevalence of the disaster myth should give us pause about continuing to house the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
The true nightmare of Katrina was not the anarchy and violence reported to have consumed the city; rather, it was the painfully slow and often misguided response—spurred in part by the disaster myth of widespread looting and violence—that compounded the suffering of Katrina’s victims and all but guaranteed that disaster would become catastrophe. If we are to avoid that nightmare scenario in future disasters, we must reform both the design and implementation of our disaster laws to avoid the overemphasis on security and law enforcement that the disaster myth encourages.
Moreover, by continuing the dialogue between disaster sociology and disaster law that this Article has begun, we can help ensure that our legal framework for natural disaster response is designed and implemented based on accurate assessments of post-disaster human behavior. As we take the necessary steps to counter the deleterious impact of disaster mythology on our legal system of disaster response, we will be better prepared to meet the challenge of minimizing human suffering in the face of future natural disasters that will surely come.![]()
Acknowledgments:
Lisa Grow Sun is an Associate Professor of Law at the J. Reuben Clark Law School at Brigham Young University.
This editorial is based on Lisa Grow Sun’s article, Lisa Grow Sun, Disaster Mythology and the Law, 96 CORNELL L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2011).
- Oprah Reports, Oprah.com (Sept. 6, 2005), http://www.oprah.com/slideshow/oprahshow/oprahshow1_ss_20050906/2. ↩
- Brian Thevenot, Myth-Making in New Orleans, Am. Journalism Rev., Dec. 2005–Jan. 2006, at 30, 34 (internal quotation marks omitted). ↩
- Maureen Dowd, Op-Ed., United States of Shame, N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 2005, at A21, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/03/opinion/03dowd.html?scp=1&sq=Maureen%20Dowd%20United%20States%20of%20Shame&st=cse. ↩
- Guy Dinmore, City of Rape, Rumour and Recrimination, Fin. Times, Sept. 5, 2005, at 7. ↩
- See Robert Mendick, Gang Rule and Rape in Hurricane Dome . . . It’s Like a Mad Max Movie, Evening Standard (London), Sept. 2, 2005, at 6 (“It was like something out of Lord Of The Flies—one minute everything is calm and civil, the next it descends into chaos.”). ↩
- Thevenot, supra note 2, at 33. ↩
- Id. ↩
- Ellen Barry et al., New Orleans Slides into Chaos; U.S. Scrambles to Send Troops, L.A. Times, Sept. 2, 2005, at 1. ↩
- Ann Scott Tyson, Troops Back from Iraq Find Another War Zone: In New Orleans, ‘It’s Like Baghdad on a Bad Day,’ Wash. Post, Sept. 6, 2005, at A10. ↩
- Jaime Omar Yassin, Demonizing the Victims of Katrina, Extra!, Nov.–Dec. 2005, http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=2793. ↩
- 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–335 (2006). ↩
- Katy Reckdahl, The Myths of New Orleans, Tucson Weekly, Aug. 24, 2006, http://www.tucsonweekly.com/tucson/the-myths-of-new-orleans/Content?oid=1085005 (internal quotation marks omitted). ↩
- Select Bipartisan Comm. to Investigate the Preparation for & Response to Hurricane Katrina, Supplementary Report, at 51 (2006), reprinted in, A Failure of Initiative, H.R. Rep. No. 109–377, app. 8, at 486 (2006). ↩
- 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5208 (2006). ↩
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Guilt by (More Than) Association: The Case for Spectator Liability in Gang Rapes
In 2009, a 15-year-old student from Richmond, California left her homecoming dance to join a drinking session on school property. She quickly became intoxicated and, over the next two hours, was attacked by as many as ten assailants who “laughed and took photos as they took turns” raping her. Police eventually found the girl lying semiconscious under a picnic table. Detective Ken Greco, who had been in law enforcement for 29 years, said the crime “‘shocked the conscience of responding officers.’” Equally shocking, however, is the fact that as many as two dozen bystanders witnessed the gang rape, but none called the police. Some onlookers took photos with their cell phones, which suggests that they viewed the gang rape as a spectacle.
The “‘extremely callous and brutal’” nature of the crime sparked outrage and “‘sent shockwaves throughout the nation.’” At least one commentator called on lawmakers to hold onlookers responsible for failing to contact police in cases such as these. In response to cries for action, a California lawmaker proposed the Witness Responsibility Act, which would require a witness of a rape or homicide to report the crime to police or else face a misdemeanor charge, punishable by up to six months imprisonment and a fine of $1,500.
Statutes such as the Witness Responsibility Act improve the status quo; nonetheless, these laws fall short of bringing justice for victims of gang rapes because they fail to acknowledge that the audience does more than merely witness the gang rape.1 Though it is wrong to fail to contact police, the greater wrong is the decision to watch and, through that approving presence, to encourage the rape.
There is little doubt that individuals who affirmatively participate in the gang rape (for instance, through cheering on the perpetrators) are complicit in the crime. However, even the silent audience member, though perhaps not liable as an accomplice, plays an encouraging role worthy of criminal liability in some form. Properly understood, gang rapes involve all of the audience members, or “spectators,” who are intentionally present at the gang rape. Social science literature has recognized for decades that gang rape is inherently a group crime and is a medium for the group members, both the rapists and spectators, to interact with one another. Because the objective of a gang rape is to perform sexually in front of an audience, the audience is a key motivating factor in the crime.
It is this motivating role that justifies criminal liability for spectators. Even so, the law has hitherto failed to appreciate the unique group dynamic of gang rapes. The law does not touch the group member who intentionally watches and enjoys the gang rape; indeed, even aiders and abetters who cheer on the rapists, who snap photos, or who otherwise facilitate the gang rape are rarely held accountable. In other words, the law ignores the motivating role that “spectators” play in gang rapes.
At the same time, the law recognizes the motivating role of spectators in other crimes—drag racing and dogfighting, for example. Forty-eight states have outlawed knowing and intentional presence at a dogfight, and three states and numerous municipalities have done the same for drag races. In doing so, state and local governments have recognized that effectively deterring a crime requires targeting the motivation.
San Diego is one such example. In 2002, the city became the first to pass an ordinance criminalizing spectatorship at a drag race. The city found that existing laws did not adequately deter drag racing and that “a motivating factor for the racers was the presence and reaction of the spectators.” The San Diego City Attorney’s press secretary explained that the “aim of the ordinance [is] to target the hundreds of spectators that, by their mere presence, [fuel] the illegal races and exhibitions of speed.” Thus, San Diego recognized that spectators can be a motivating element in drag racing and began to target that motivation.
The ordinance worked. The San Diego City Attorney touted the spectator ordinance as a success, noting that it “has had a huge impact on public health and safety which is saving lives.” In 2003, San Diego saw “a 99% reduction in organized illegal street racing activity . . . and a 79% improvement in . . . crash mortality/morbidity.” Other cities and states have followed San Diego’s lead. In all, at least ten cities or counties and three states have criminalized participating in a drag race as a spectator.
Much like drag racing, dogfighting is a sport that is fueled by the presence of spectators. Dogfighting spectator laws, which are on the books in forty-eight states, are a recognition that “‘[b]reeding animals to fight doesn’t happen in a vacuum.’” The decision to fight dogs is influenced by more than the dog owners’ own personal entertainment. One motivation is profit gained from the spectators’ admissions fees and wagers. Another is “street cred” or “bragging rights.” Because some receive no prize money, their only motivation for participating in fights is the “status” they achieve in the eyes of their spectators. A third is the “sport” of the fights, because “[w]ithout the presence of spectators . . . much of the ‘sport’ in animal fighting would be eliminated.”
Masculinity and group identity also play an important role in dogfighting. Dogfighting groups identify as “fraternities,” a term that underscores the group’s status as a brotherhood. Dogfighting is a means of showing aggression, establishing a masculine identity within the group, and maintaining “a sense of belonging and solidarity with other men.” Without an audience, there would be no group identity, no status, and no validation of the dogmen’s masculinity within the group. Thus, dogfighting is merely the chosen method of asserting masculinity; it is the presence of others at a dogfight that is critical to establishing one’s masculinity with the fraternity.
Much like drag races and dogfights, spectators play an important motivating role in gang rapes. Before examining this role, however, it is important to first displace the notion that all types of rape result from the same motivations.
In his famous studies on rapists, A. Nicholas Groth identified three “patterns” of rape: “(1) the anger rape, in which sexuality becomes a hostile act; (2) the power rape, in which sexuality becomes an expression of conquest; and (3) the sadistic rape, in which anger and power become eroticized.” In each instance, the motivations are distinctly different. In the anger rape, the assault “becomes a means of expressing and discharging feelings of pent-up anger and rage” and a way to “retaliate for perceived wrongs or rejections [the rapist] has suffered at the hands of women.” For power rapists, the critical motivation is the desire to dominate a victim in order to establish control over the victim. The rape is “a means for compensating for underlying feelings of inadequacy” and is an attempt to satisfy the rapist’s need for control and authority. The rare case is the sadistic rapist. For these perpetrators, “[h]atred and control are eroticized.” The sadistic rapist “takes pleasure in [the victim’s] torment, anguish, distress, helplessness, and suffering.”
Others have expanded upon Groth’s work to identify motivations in non-traditional rapes. In some instances, rape is used to insult an enemy or to exert power over other men. At other times, men rape to enhance their masculinity by contrasting it with the weakness of the feminine victim. Yet another form of rape, termed “corrective rape,” is intended to “‘cure’ lesbians of their nonconforming sexual orientation” or “nonconforming sexual identities” and is motivated by a “continued misunderstanding of and animus toward homosexuality.”
Gang rapes are unlike each of these forms of rape, however. Each of gang rape’s purposes revolves around the group dynamic and the presence of an audience, just like drag races and dogfights. At times, the purpose of gang rape is to unite the men in the group, both co-offender and spectator, to each other and to “maintain[] or creat[e] images and roles within the group.” Gang rape can be intended to “foster feelings of rapport, fellowship, and cooperation among assailants” or can be a means of “prov[ing] [rapists’] virility or masculinity . . . by performing sexually in the presence of the group.” The rapist may seek to impress the group members, who he feels are “evaluating his performance.” In other instances, gang rape can also be used as a reinforcing mechanism for group membership. Or, as Bernard Lefkowitz observes, it is often a combination of all these factors:
The real goal is overcoming your own insecurities by impressing your friends with your sexual prowess. To achieve that goal, a guy needs an audience to witness his dominating performance. A group of appreciative and responsive buddies is essential to build a reputation for sexual control and domination.
Thus gang rape is inherently a group activity and “a vehicle for interacting with the other men”—it is not merely “‘a series of single rapes on one victim in close temporal and spatial relationship to each other.’” Whatever the end goal, the “unique group dynamic of a gang rape” is of particular importance because, as Katharine Baker notes, “having an audience is critical; intercourse is instrumental.”
The foregoing demonstrates that gang rape is a crime that involves, and indeed requires, an audience. This is particularly true for a subset of gang rapists who rape only in the context of a group. Groth and Birnbaum have identified two categories of gang rapists: “instigators” and “followers.” The instigators are the ones who initiate the rape and who encourage the followers to participate. Instigators are more likely to rape in other contexts, such as in solitary rapes. Instigators benefit from the group dynamic of the rape by feeling a sense of control over the victim and the gang members, and by feeling “a sense of power from being the leader.” In contrast, “followers” participate in the rape because they are persuaded to and because the presence of others “diminishes their sense of personal responsibility” for the rape. The audience is the essential ingredient for the approximately forty-three percent of gang rapists who are “followers,” because followers rape only in a group context. For the follower, the gang rape is intended to “confirm his masculinity, achieve recognition, and/or retain his acceptance with his co-offenders.” Thus, for both instigators and followers, the presence of others is a primary motivating force in committing the gang rape, perhaps even more so than the rape itself.
The presence of both participating and spectating gang members can influence the behavior of the participating gang rapists in other important ways. First, in a larger group, an individual often feels more pressure to conform to the group norm. Thus, the more members in a group, the more likely it is that each gang member will go along with the group. Second, the presence of approving peers reassures rapists that their behavior is acceptable and even “normal.” Third, because the group as a whole is committing the rape, responsibility is diffused among all the group members, such that none of the rapists feels that he, individually, is accountable. This “diffusion of responsibility,” then, decreases the likelihood that a gang rapist will feel that he is obligated to stop the rape or to refuse to participate himself. A diminished sense of responsibility may reduce one’s sense of guilt or shame. Fourth, the presence of others may lead individuals to feel more anonymous; this, in turn, causes “deindividuation,” which is “the loss of self-awareness in one’s beliefs, morals, and standards in a group setting.” Deindividuation occurs when the individual’s identity becomes “submerged” in the identity of the group, such that the individual becomes “more likely to behave in accordance with” the norms of the group. The feeling of anonymity in a group “reduces [individuals’] sense of personal accountability,” which can lead to “aggressive, disturbing, and antisocial behavior.”
Thus, the presence of others at a gang rape is crucial in two regards. First, the group context leads to behavior-impacting phenomena such as deindividuation, which allows the individual to commit acts that the individual would not commit alone. And second, gang rapists are uniquely motivated by the presence of others, because gang rapists commit the rape to perform for the “audience.” Far from being mere passive witnesses to the rape, spectators create and contribute to group dynamic of the rape, thereby facilitating the commission of the crime. Just as this motivating element justifies criminal liability for spectators who knowingly and intentionally watch drag races and dogfights, the motivating presence of “spectator” gang members should also justify the creation of gang rape spectator laws.
Although spectator laws are well-accepted and the most appropriate form of criminal liability where the audience motivates the crime, these laws are most vulnerable to the criticism that they punish “mere presence” at a crime. It is widely accepted that “mere presence” is insufficient to sustain criminal liability for three reasons: first, it fails to require that the accused have a culpable mindset in order to be guilty; second, it does not require an affirmative act; and third, it is vague and fails to place individuals on notice of the conduct proscribed, as individuals cannot adjust their behavior to avoid inadvertent presence at the wrong place at the wrong time.
In most states, any affirmative conduct that encourages the crime is sufficient for criminal liability. Even so, what constitutes “mere presence” at a gang rape—as opposed to presence that provides assistance or encouragement to the perpetrator—is not a settled question. Prosecution practices in high profile cases indicate that prosecutors often do not consider anything short of direct, physical acts to be participation in the gang rape. For instance, in the New Bedford, Massachusetts gang rape trial, prosecutors alleged in their opening statement that “several men at the bar ‘were cheering like at a baseball game’” while watching the rape, but none of these spectators was charged for encouraging the crime. Despite public pressure to charge the spectators, the prosecutor determined that “[m]ere presence during a crime is not enough . . . . You must have participated.” In this way, the prosecutor confused spectators’ active encouragement of the crime with a mere failure to report the crime. At least one commenter has argued that the spectators’ cheering in this case was sufficient for accomplice liability under Massachusetts law; even so, not one of them was charged under that, or any other, theory. Indeed, I have found only one case that supposed, in dicta, that laughing and vocal encouragement of a gang rape could have been sufficient to sustain some form of criminal liability. But again, in that case, the spectators were not charged.
Were states to begin to charge aiders and abettors as gang rape spectators, states will have to defend the statutes’ constitutionality. Most courts have had little trouble upholding spectator laws. In Commonwealth v. Craven, for instance, the court held that an animal fight spectator statute did not criminalize “mere presence” at an animal fight. The court distinguished “attendance at an animal fight ‘as a spectator’” from “‘presence’” because a spectator is “‘one that looks on or beholds,’” whereas “‘presence’” is “‘the state of being in one place and not elsewhere.’” Thus, the court held, the terms “presence” and “spectator” “are clearly distinct.” The court reasoned that, because attending an animal fight as a spectator is a conscious choice, “[a] spectator does more than a person who is merely present at a particular place by happenstance.”
A second Pennsylvania case, Commonwealth v. Holstein, applied the same reasoning in a drag racing statute. The defendant was convicted under the statute for attending a drag race as a spectator, though the statute did not explicitly define spectatorship as a form of participation. The defendant admitted that she had intended to view an illegal race, but argued that being a spectator did not amount to participating in a drag race. The court rejected her argument and held that “knowingly attend[ing] an illegal drag racing event as a conscious and voluntary spectator” was a form of participation and was thus prohibited under the statute.
Numerous other published and unpublished opinions have held along similar lines.2 As these cases show, it is well accepted that a spectator statute that requires proof of intent and knowledge meets the mens rea requirement, gives the accused fair notice of the conduct proscribed, and is not unconstitutionally vague. A handful of cases also support the argument that spectatorship, on its own, constitutes “participation” in a crime.
Applying these principles, there is no constitutional obstacle to statutes punishing gang rape spectators. Indeed, such liability is entirely unexceptional. First, criminalizing knowing and intentional presence at a gang rape does not violate our constitutional commitment against punishing “mere presence” at a crime scene because knowing and intentional presence at a gang rape involves a conscious choice by the accused. For example, in the case of the mentally challenged girl from Glen Ridge, New Jersey who was gang raped in a basement, thirteen baseball players assembled in the basement, but six chose to leave. Of the seven who made a knowing and intentional decision to remain, three did not physically participate in the gang rape. Rather, they purposefully remained in the room to watch their comrades do it. They were not “merely present” at the gang rape—they did not happen to walk by and see it, and they were not merely aware that it was going on. Because the decision to watch the gang rape was a conscious choice, these men possessed a guilty mind, and they could have been prosecuted under a “spectator” law for their involvement as “spectators” in the gang rape.
Second, a law criminalizing knowing and intentional presence at a gang rape would provide sufficient notice of the conduct proscribed and would not be unconstitutionally vague. The Supreme Court has held in Kolender v. Lawson that a criminal statute must “define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” An explicitly worded spectator statute would easily meet this standard. Because individuals covered under the statute would not be passersby or mere witnesses to the crime, they would be able to arrange their conduct so as to avoid criminal liability.
Gang rape spectator laws are not only constitutionally sound but are wholly justified. As argued above, the primary justification is that spectators play an important motivating role in the crime. Another weighty justification is that the laws would express disapproval for participating in a gang rape as a spectator. Laws serve an important “expressive” function because laws communicate “a society’s values, what it esteems, what it abhors.” A law criminalizing an act sends a clear statement that society views the act as wrong and worthy of criminal punishment. In other words, the law identifies the kinds of behavior that society is willing to accept and reject.
Changing a law, however, does more than express approval or disapproval. Because the law carries moral weight, a change in the “statement” the law makes can also shift the social norms that ultimately affect behavior. In this way, the law can be used to “reconstruct existing norms and to change the social meaning of action through a legal expression . . . about appropriate behavior.” By legitimizing or delegitimizing certain conduct, the law can “work directly against existing norms and push them in new directions.” This, in turn, informs individuals’ expectations about the behavior of other people and leads them to conform their behavior to the perceived judgments of others.
Shockingly, the norm among certain groups of men is that gang rape, euphemistically called “pulling train,” is neither morally nor legally wrong. As Nathan McCall, an admitted gang rapist, put it, “few guys thought of [gang rape] as rape. It was viewed as a social thing among hanging partners, like passing a joint.” If men believe the gang rape itself is not wrong, they may have no qualms watching, enjoying, and encouraging the gang rape. By explicitly criminalizing this behavior, states would make a statement that this behavior is societally unacceptable, a statement which could eventually begin to inform and shape young men’s views on gang rape.
Once a baseline norm is established that spectatorship in gang rapes is both criminal and morally wrong, it would be possible to create a subsidiary norm, one that encourages potential spectators to intervene. Researchers are beginning to understand the power of bystanders in preventing, rather than motivating or encouraging, rapes. The key to a bystander’s willingness to intervene is the bystander’s own beliefs or attitudes toward rape. “[L]imited but promising” findings indicate that through changing bystander norms, it is possible to reduce the acceptance of rape myths, increase the incidence of bystander intervention in rapes, and consequently decrease the likelihood that rapes will occur. These programs demonstrate that, when would-be spectators possess the right norms—norms that are in no small part influenced by the law—bystander intervention can be “a powerful prevention tool to ultimately reduce the occurrence of rape.”
A second justification for “spectator” gang rape laws is their potential deterrent effect. Because gang rapes tend to involve young men, a change in the “statement” of the law may have an even greater impact on gang rapes than it would on crimes that tend to involve older offenders. One study on the efficacy of witness reporting laws found that participants under the age of twenty-five were more likely to intervene and report a gang rape when the law required that they do so. The law influenced their behavior more than it influenced the behavior of older participants in the study. The authors explained that “younger persons are more responsive to law mandates.” This is because individuals in adolescence and early adulthood seek to “align [their] behavior in accordance with social expectations and norms”—expectations that are informed, in part, by the law. Thus, by criminalizing presence as a spectator at a gang rape, states can shift societal expectations and norms—norms that will inform young men’s senses of moral judgment and, perhaps, influence their behavior accordingly.
A final justification is that “spectator” gang rape laws would help to bring about justice for the victims of gang rapes. It seems fundamentally unjust that the law ignores individuals who play such an important motivating role in the gang rape, even as the law recognizes this same role in much less heinous crimes such as drag races and dogfights. By themselves, spectators inflict additional and unique harms on the victim, harms that are above and beyond those imposed by the rapists. Spectators should be held liable for the substantial role they play in gang rapes, not only so that this behavior is deterred in the future, but also so that the blameworthy are punished and the victim’s suffering is fully avenged. In turning a blind eye to spectators’ involvement in gang rapes, the law has turned its back on the victims, as well. It is time for the law to fully redress the harm done to victims of gang rapes. It is time to hold spectators accountable for their wrongs. ![]()
Acknowledgments:
Special thanks to Professor Jane Aiken for her unflagging support and invaluable guidance, and to Professor Anne Coughlin for her enthusiastic feedback. I am also indebted to William Murray and the staff of The Georgetown Law Journal for their tireless efforts.
Copyright © 2011 Georgetown Law Journal.
Kimberley K. Allen is a 2011 graduate of the Georgetown University Law Center; University of Texas at Dallas, B.S. 2008.
This editorial is based on Ms. Allen’s essay in the March, 2011 issue of the Georgetown Law Journal: Kimberley K. Allen, Guilt by (More Than) Association: The Case for Spectator Liability in Gang Rapes, 99 Geo. L.J. 837 (2011).
- This Note draws a distinction between witnesses or bystanders, who see that a rape is occurring but do not involve themselves in the rape or choose to watch, and spectators, who knowingly and intentionally watch the rape. Witness reporting laws miss this distinction and lump both groups of nonparticipants together. ↩
- See, e.g., People v. Elder, 247 Cal. Rptr. 647, 647 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding statute which the court interpreted to require knowing presence as a spectator at an animal fight); People v. Bergen, 883 P.2d, 532, 545 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (rejecting the argument that a statute that prohibited “knowingly attending a dogfight held for profit or entertainment” criminalized “mere presence”); Gonzalez v. State, 941 So.2d 1226, 1229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that “{t}he requirement that the conduct be done ‘knowingly’ . . . establishes a level of mens rea required under the statute . . .” and holding that the law was sufficiently clear so that the rule of lenity did not apply); State v. Arnold, 557 S.E.2d 119, 122 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that statute which prohibited “participat{ing} as a spectator at an exhibition featuring the fighting or baiting of a dog” was not unconstitutionally vague); State v. Weeks, No. 91-A-1634, 1992 Ohio App LEXIS 1090, at *5–14 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (upholding a portion of a statute which prohibited “knowingly purchas{ing} a ticket of admission to {an animal fight} or . . . witness{ing} such a spectacle” but striking down a phrase in the statute that prohibited mere presence at such an animal fight); Edmondson v. Pearce, 91 P.3d 605, 637–38 (Okla. 2004) (rejecting facial constitutional challenge to law criminalizing knowing and intentional presence at a cockfight and dismissing the argument that the law would ensnare innocent passersby); Peck v. Dunn, 574 P.2d 367, 370 (Utah 1978) (upholding an ordinance that criminalized presence as a spectator at an animal fight because it did not criminalize being a “mere passerby”). But see, e.g., Greer v. State, 563 So.2d 39 (Ala. Ct. Cr. App. 1990) (holding that being a spectator at a drag race, without some further encouragement of the race, is mere presence); State v. Maravola, 198 N.E.2d 88, 89 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963) (holding that the voluntary presence of persons at a drag race did not constitute “rendering assistance” to a drag race under the statute). ↩
Posted in Criminal Law & Procedure, Georgetown Law Journal, Law Review Note
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Sixth Circuit Notes Split Re Subclassing and Bifurcation
Civil Procedure—Class Actions
Randleman v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Co. (79 U.S.L.W. 2590) (May 2011)
Issue: May subclassing and bifurcation be used to remedy predominance issues in class actions? The Sixth Circuit, declining to take sides, notes that the Second and Ninth circuits allow the practices so long as common issues predominate, while the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits do not permit them.
Randleman v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Co. (79 U.S.L.W. 2590) (May 2011)
Issue: May subclassing and bifurcation be used to remedy predominance issues in class actions? The Sixth Circuit, declining to take sides, notes that the Second and Ninth circuits allow the practices so long as common issues predominate, while the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits do not permit them.
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